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Executive Summary 
 
This study explores private finance mobilized by Switzerland in the context of the goal of 
industrialized countries to mobilize USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from public and private 
sources, to address the needs of developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate 
change.  
 
Estimating private finance mobilized by Switzerland that contributes to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries is very difficult because of several reasons. First, the Swiss 
private sector is currently not reporting information on climate-related finance. Second, both 
internationally and nationally, there is a lack of clear definitions of key terms, such as “private 
finance”, “contributing to climate change mitigation or adaptation”, and “developing countries”. Third, it 
is not possible to assign a monetary value to several activities of Swiss companies with benefits 
for developing countries, e.g. research & development, transfer of environmental standards and 
climate-friendly technologies, consulting, education and awareness raising. 
 
This study addressed these measuring challenges in the following way; first, questionnaires were 
sent to a range of private actors that are financing climate-related projects. Second, detailed 
guidance was given in the questionnaire on how to understand key terms. Third, activities of Swiss 
companies, to which no monetary value could be assigned, were also covered by the questionnaire 
and listed in a separate section. Using this approach, we identified at least CHF 0.2-0.8 billion of 
private finance that is annually mobilized by Switzerland and contributes to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.  
 
However, the estimate of CHF 0.2-0.8 billion rather underestimates real finance figures as it is based 
on only 35 questionnaires completed by Swiss companies, NGOs and governmental agencies, while 
the number of relevant private actors is more than double. The return of questionnaires was 
incomplete due to transaction costs and the fact that many companies do not internally 
measure climate-related flows. The assumption that the real number is under-estimated is 
supported by our top-down estimate, which is based on likely Swiss shares of global flows: 
using this top-down approach, private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland, is estimated at 
CHF 0.5-2.7 billion per year.  
 
The main reason for low-data quality is that well-established systems for measurement, 
reporting and verification (MRV) only exist for two types of private climate-related financial 
flows: compliance carbon market payments and investments mobilized by carbon market 
payments. Building up reliable MRV systems for other flows may be burdensome, particularly for 
investments of the Swiss private sector. Therefore, it may be recommendable to wait for international 
(or national) decisions that provide the necessary guidance on which private flows are to be 
considered before building up costly MRV systems. For better understanding the Swiss private sector 
flows, a workshop with industry experts may be useful. 
 
While this study has estimated all different types of climate-friendly flows, it has internationally never 
been clarified which types of private flows are to be included in the USD 100 billion. On the 
basis of relevant international negotiation texts, we derive several potential criteria for 
inclusion, such as “mobilized by governments”, “covering incremental costs”, “no double counting 
with emission reduction targets”, and only accounting “direct North-South flows”. Applying such 
criteria has major implications on the size of flows, e.g. the requirement that finance has to cover 
incremental costs would exclude most investment flows and “no double counting with emission 
targets” would exclude most carbon market payments. Using just these two criteria together would 
substantially lower the amount of Swiss private finance as part of the USD 100 billion. 
 
As potential next steps, Switzerland may consider to clarify its own position on “private climate 
finance” and initiate or support international discussions on the definition of “climate-friendly” and 
“mobilized” private finance. As long as no international definitions are available, it seems to be 
warranted to focus on the flows to be included in the 2014 biennial update report to the 
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UNFCCC – private finance mobilized by governmental agencies. For private finance mobilized by 
bilateral agencies, a Swiss-internal assessment is to be considered; for multilateral agencies and 
banks, Switzerland may support international initiatives to elaborate acceptable ways of measuring 
private finance mobilized by multilateral agencies.  
 
In the end, MRV is just one of two key questions in relation to private finance as part of long-
term climate finance. The second, and for the climate regime the most important question is 
how to mobilize private finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries. In this regard, policy makers will have to analyze and strengthen not only international 
climate policy but also, or even more enabling environments at the national level, including climate 
policies in developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to decision 1/CP.16, para 98-100 at UNFCCC COP 16 (UNFCCC 2010), developed country 
Parties committed, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on 
implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs 
of developing countries (adaptation and mitigation). These funds may come from a wide variety of 
sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources (e.g. new carbon 
emission levies). Decision 2/CP.17, para 127-131 of COP 17 in Durban specifies a work programme 
on this long-term climate finance (UNFCCC 2011). 
 
Although a small number of Parties from developing countries continue to argue that funding should 
come entirely from public/government sources, it is generally accepted – and in line with COP 
decisions – that private sector finance will contribute towards the goal of USD 100 billion. However, in 
the climate change negotiations it has never been clarified which activities or financing modes by the 
private sector would be included and accounted towards that goal. Similarly, attempts to get a COP 
decision regarding a burden sharing mechanism and a comprehensive mechanism to identify and 
monitor the private flows of financial support failed, and attempts for harmonized monitoring and 
reporting of public flows are in early stages. Furthermore, according to decision 2/CP.17, para 121f in 
Durban (UNFCCC 2011), the Standing Committee will prepare a biennial overview of climate finance 
flows, summarizing national communications and biennial reports of both developed and developing 
countries. According to Annex 1 to decision 2/CP.17, para 19, developed countries will have to report 
biennially on private financial flows leveraged by bilateral climate finance as well as policies and 
measures that promote the scaling up of private investment in mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries. This reporting is separate to reporting on public flows (para 17) (UNFCCC 2011). 
 
 
1.1 Challenges 
 
The existing efforts to track climate finance lack transparency, comparability and comprehensiveness. 
This is true for public sector finance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011), despite common rules and 
ongoing improvements under the OECD DAC tracking system, and even more so for private sector 
finance, where the landscape is very complex (Atteridge, 2011; Stadelmann et al., 2011a). Not even 
the UN High Advisory Group on Climate Financing has attempted to estimate existing private flows 
and focused on discussing how to leverage private investments (UN, 2010a). 
 
This lack of clarity affects international climate policy negatively by enabling distrust and blame games 
on the fulfilment of commitments. At the same time, it is clear that against the background of the huge 
needs for investments in low-carbon technologies and climate-resilient measures, private sector 
financing sources will be more than just a supplement for public finance but will have to make up the 
vast majority of investment capital. It is argued that by 2030, around USD 175 billion of finance 
covering mitigation costs (e.g. public finance or carbon market payments) are needed to mobilize USD 
560 billion of mainly private investments per year that will allow to limit man-made climate change to 
2°C (McKinsey, 2009)  
 
Total current private sector finance mobilized by industrialized countries (governments and 
companies) that supports climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries has been 
estimated to be in the range of USD 60 – 160 billion per year (Buchner et al., 2011b; Stadelmann et 
al., 2011a), the substantial range is mainly due to different definitions, for example climate-specific 
finance vs. climate-relevant finance, and data gaps. However, not all of it may be counted towards the 
“goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion”.  As some argue, there will have to be a traceable causal 
link between governmental action, in particular public finance and the triggered or leveraged climate 
finance by the private sector, and it is questionable if financial flows to buy carbon credits used to fulfil 
targets pledged by Annex-1 countries should be eligible due to potential double accounting. Looking at 
the reporting guidelines, para 19 of decision 2/CP.17 does not mention flows related to the market 
mechanisms but only those “leveraged by bilateral climate finance”. 
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1.2 Switzerland’s interest 
 
A system for measuring, reporting and verification of private sector climate finance will eventually be 
negotiated and agreed internationally. This will hopefully include sufficiently clear definitions and 
choices regarding the assignment of responsibilities. But this will take a long time, and in the 
meantime developed countries will have to provide information on their flows of finance.  
 
Similarly as in the case of Fast-Start Finance, where Switzerland has been a front-runner in own 
definitions on several crucial issues such as “new and additional” baselines and the formula for the fair 
share of each country towards the USD 30 billion, Switzerland may want to develop its definitions, 
baselines and formula for measuring its fair share of the USD 100 billion figure. 
 
The calls from developing countries and several NGOs that the entire USD 100 billion should come 
from public sources are not acceptable for industrialized countries. However, these calls increase the 
pressure for clear and rather restrictive definitions which type of private finance flows should be 
counted towards the USD 100 billion. 
 
Switzerland is favouring that private sector financing is accounted for, and has, therefore, used a 
broad definition of the private sector in past discussion. However, a quantification of the private sector 
flows or share has never been attained.  
 
 
1.3 Purpose of the study and key definitions “private climate finance” 
 
In view of the forthcoming discussions in the context of the Green Climate Fund and long term finance 
in general, as well as the biennial reporting as decided by the UNFCCC COP 17 in Durban, 
Switzerland would like to dispose of better information regarding current flows of climate finance by 
the Swiss private sector and possible methodologies and metrics1 through a commissioned study. 
Findings of the study will be utilized as inputs or submissions into the UNFCCC process as well as into 
relevant fora such as OECD workshops or the Research Collaborative on tracking private climate 
finance. 
 
For the purpose of this study we define “private climate finance” as “investments, donations or other 
financial means of the private sector that support climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries”. Developing countries are defined as countries that are not part of the OECD2. 
 
 
1.4 Structure of this study 
 
In a first step, this study will estimate current private climate finance (in developing countries) 
mobilized by Switzerland, as far as current information allows for such an estimate. As a second step, 
we analyse the existing systems for measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) these flows, in order to 
assess uncertainties and room for improvement in these MRV systems. In a third step, we analyze 
criteria to include or exclude some of the private climate finance flows from the USD 100 billion figure; 
and criteria to attribute these flows to Switzerland or other industrialized countries. Finally, we explore 
the implications of these criteria for the volume of Swiss private flows that would be accounted as part 
of overall Swiss climate finance, and sketch potential next steps for the Swiss government.  
 
 
                                                    
1 i.e. regarding which financial flows by multinational companies should be accounted to whom, weighting of CDM projects, etc. 
2 Note that this definition is not necessarily the official position of Switzerland. In the questionnaire, we also included flows to 
Chile, Israel, Mexico, South Korea, which are OECD countries but were originally in the climate regime considered as 
developing countries, but no Swiss private finance was reported to flow to these countries. 
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2. Preliminary overview of private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland 
 
The private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland (private and public sector) that supports climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries was estimated both top-down, based on 
global figures and Swiss funding shares in related areas, and bottom-up, based on a questionnaire 
sent to 80 relevant companies, governmental agencies and organizations in Switzerland 
(questionnaire is provided in the annex). We received feedback from more than 35 companies, 
agencies and organizations. A wide range of financial flows was considered that partially overlap (see 
Figure 1). For simplicity, we will assume in the following an exchange rate of 1 USD = 1 CHF for the 
years 2009-2011.  
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N-S = North-South; source: adapted from Stadelmann et al. (2011a); Flows with a solid line are reported below. 
 
 
 
2.1 Carbon market payments  
 
Carbon market payments are purchases of securities related to the reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions, also called carbon credits or emissions allowances. Carbon market units are either 
purchased to comply with international or national obligations (compliance market) or because of 
voluntary reasons, e.g. to offset air travel emissions (voluntary market). Most of these payments are 
made by private companies. Only carbon credits related to emission reductions in developing 
countries are considered here.  
 
In the compliance market, Switzerland is estimated to pay annually around CHF 50 million for Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) credits to comply with its targets under the Kyoto Protocol in the 
period 2008-2012. This is about 2.5% of the global estimated payments for CDM credits in the years 
2008-2011 (USD 1.4-3.4 billion in 2008-2011, see Stadelmann et al. 2011a)3. The credit payments 
include  the expenditures of the Climate Cent (around CHF 50 million per year) for purchasing CDM 
credits with the revenue from a levy on gasoline and diesel (Climate Cent, 2011) and CDM credits 
purchased by companies in the Swiss Emission Trading System, estimated at CHF 0.1 million per 
year, based on the 28,000 CERs surrendered in the years 2008-2010 (BAFU, 2012). The top-down 
estimate is very close to the bottom-up results from the questionnaires (around CHF 46 million). 
 
In the voluntary market, Swiss companies and organizations4 are estimated to have paid USD 5-6 
million for carbon credits from developing countries in 2010/2011. The lower figure was estimated by 
multiplying the transaction volume for credits from developing countries with the approximate share of 
Swiss customers of non-US voluntary credits in 2010 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011), while the upper 
                                                    
3 The global payments were estimated by multiplying issued credits per year times average carbon price. The average price was 
estimated by weighing the primary credit price with the percentage of bilateral projects (projects with Northern project 
participant) and the secondary credit price with the percentage of unilateral CDM projects (without Northern project participant). 
4 We define “Swiss company / organization” here as a company / organization that has its headquarter located in Switzerland. 
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figure is the volume voluntary offsets purchased by Swiss buyers in the year 2011 (Peters-Stanley and 
Hamilton, 2012), assuming all of the offsets are taking place in developing countries as is the case for 
the largest Swiss offset providers. The Swiss share of the global voluntary offset market for credits in 
developing countries is around 1-1.5%. Full bottom-up results are not yet available, but from the 
existing questionnaires we estimate payments of at least CHF 9-11 million per year. 
 
 
2.2 Non-return oriented finance (with climate benefits) 
 
Non-return oriented finance (with climate benefits) is defined as donations or investments with no 
return or carbon credits expectations but climate change (mitigation and/or mitigation) benefits in 
developing countries5. The most relevant flows in this regard are programmes of development and 
humanitarian organizations as well as corporate initiatives and donations.  
 
Our top-down estimate is that Swiss development and humanitarian organizations are contributing 
around CHF 5-40 million per year for programmes with climate benefits in developing countries. The 
lower figure is derived from US philanthropy donations for climate change (USD 0.15-0.2 billion, see 
Buchner et al., 2011b), and the Swiss (1%) and US (31%) share in philanthropy donations for 
developing countries (Hudson Institute, 2011). The upper figure is estimated from the Swiss private 
donations for development NGOs in 2008 and 2009 (~CHF 400 million, see DEZA and SECO, 2011) 
and the upper bound of estimated share of ODA projects contributing to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation (5-10%6). It has to be noted that Swiss private development organizations see their 
programmes as primarily development-oriented, while climate change mitigation and adaptation is 
seen as co-benefit. Therefore, they question if any of their money can be seen as additional climate 
funding (meeting with representative, April 2012). The corporate climate initiatives of Swiss companies 
– climate change initiatives where companies do not expect any monetary return – are not estimated 
due to definitional challenges. 
 
Our bottom-up estimates, based on the 35 returned questionnaires, is that Swiss companies and 
organizations provide at least CHF 16-32 million of non-return oriented climate finance per year. The 
lower figure is based on own means of the NGOs and companies, while the higher figure includes 
financing on behalf of other institutions, where double counting cannot be excluded.  
 
 
2.3 Payments for low-carbon products 
 
Industrialized countries may reduce emissions in developing countries when purchasing products that 
have a lower carbon footprint compared to similar products. For Switzerland, payments for low-carbon 
products are particularly important as almost half of emissions of Swiss consumers are from imported 
goods (Jungbluth et al., 2007).  
 
Swiss consumers already pay for low-carbon import products as Switzerland’s largest retailers Coop 
and Migros are already investing in carbon emission reductions. They are also ranked as two of the 
most sustainable retailers worldwide (Oekom Research, 2011). Some of the steps undertaken by 
these Swiss retailers are supply chain carbon reduction, carbon offsetting and the promotion of labels 
with potential climate benefits (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council7, Roundtable on Sustainable Palmoil). 
Given the difficulty to define “low-carbon product” (e.g. the problem to quantify the share of imported 
                                                    
5 In case of investments with return expectations below market rates, the difference between market rates and expected returns 
is seen as the non-return oriented part 
6 This share is a conservative estimate, derived from the share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments in 2010 
marked as principally (9%) and principally or significantly (14%) contributing to climate change (OECD, 2011a).  
7 Certification under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) does at the moment not require any carbon benefits but  the FSC 
General Assembly 2011 requested the FSC “ to recognize carbon as an environmental value and address responsible 
stewardship of carbon storage and sequestration” and "to explore the feasibility and wider implications of including natural 
ecosystems with [...] significant amounts of carbon stored in vegetation and soil as a High Conservation Value."(FSC, 2011) 
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low-carbon products that substitute higher carbon alternatives), the payments for low-carbon products 
are not estimated here. 
 
 
2.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and other investment flows  
 
FDI is relevant because it is the largest North-South financial flow since 1992 (Gentry and Esty, 1997) 
and it flows to a significant extent into mitigation-relevant sectors (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). FDI is 
where the investor receives “control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an 
enterprise that is resident in another economy” (IMF, 2009). Usually, >10% share is seen as significant 
degree of influence8. The main challenge for tracking climate-relevant FDI is the definition of which 
type of FDI is contributing to climate change adaptation and mitigation (Buchner et al., 2011a).  
 
Our top-down estimate is that Swiss companies made USD 0.2-1.1 billion in FDI contributing to 
climate change mitigation in developing countries in 2009. The lower figure is derived from Swiss 
export statistics9. The upper figure is derived from the roughly USD 29 billion of low-carbon FDI flows 
from industrialized to developing countries in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010)10. Apart from low-carbon FDI, 
low-carbon portfolio investments – international investments in low-carbon companies where the 
investor does not obtain a lasting interest or control in a foreign enterprise – may be considered 
(Stadelmann et al., 2011a) but we refrain from estimating a number given the missing data and 
methodological challenges. 
 
Bottom-up (company-based) numbers are difficult to calculate as only few companies sent the 
questionnaire back. There were three main reasons for the low rate of filled-in questionnaires 
according to the e-mail responses: lack of company-internal data, missing clarity on the definition of 
“private climate finance” and no climate-related FDI according to the view of these companies. Two 
companies reported to have invested around CHF 54 million in climate-friendly projects or companies 
in developing countries in 2011. 
 
 
2.5 Private investments mobilized by Switzerland 
 
The potentially largest private sector flow to be considered is the one of private investments mobilized 
by Switzerland. We use the term “mobilized” here as it has been used in decision 1/CP.16, para 98 
and it is more neutral than the often used term “leveraged” (which is used in Annex I to decision 
2/CP.17, para 19); the latter originally comes from debt leveraged by equity (Brown et al., 2011)11. 
Mobilized investments do not necessarily flow North-South, they may also be domestic or South-South 
investments. All investment flows accounted for, as mobilised by Switzerland, include both public and 
private investments.  
 
 
 
                                                    
8 The OECD (2008) sees influence as given if a foreign investor acquires at least 10% of the foreign company, while the IMF 
definition is more flexible. Special arrangements have been made to account for the emerging complex investment structures of 
multinational companies (e.g. holdings).  
9 We multiplied the average 2008-2010 Swiss FDI outflows to developing countries in the “electronics, energy and watches” 
sector with 38% of the share of the energy and hydro sub-sector to the overall GDP contribution of the “electronics, energy and 
watches” sector, while further multiplying this with 15-75% contributing to climate change mitigation or adaptation (this share is 
derived from the share of Swiss energy- and water-related exports, insured by the Swiss Export Risk Insurance in 2009 and 
2010, that were either promoting climate change-mitigation and/or adaptation 
10 We multiplied the UNCTAD figure (USD 29 billion) with the Swiss share of Annex-2 FDI outflows to developing countries in 
the years 2006-2010 (4%). Buchner et al. (2011b) use the figure of USD 37 billion flowing to developing countries but we deduct 
23%, the average share of low-carbon FDI flowing to developing countries that originate from other developing countries 
(UNCTAD, 2010). 
11 We refrain from distinguishing between equity and debt investment here as related data is not available and simply assuming 
common debt-to-equity ratios (see Buchner et al., 2011b) is in our view not very informative. 
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Private investments mobilized by Swiss carbon market payments 
For the compliance market, our top-down estimate is that Switzerland mobilized CHF 375-750 million 
annually in 2008-2011. This was calculated using the estimated share of Swiss compliance payments 
(2.5%) and the estimate by Stadelmann et al (2011a) that approximately USD 15-30 billion of 
investments are undertaken in CDM projects every year, which can be derived from CDM project 
document data (URC, 2012). This estimate assumes that all investments in CDM projects would not 
have happened without carbon market payments, which is not always the case according to several 
studies (Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2009). We were not able to estimate a bottom-up 
number as the questionnaires filled out by Swiss companies stated that no private investments was 
mobilized with carbon market payments. These statements may not be realistic, as it would mean that 
none of the promoted projects were additional to the business-as-usual scenario12. As a proxy for 
mobilized investments, the numbers in the UNEP RISOE Centre CDM pipeline (URC, 2012) could be 
linked to the carbon credit purchases under the Swiss government’s Climate Cent programme. 
 
Investments mobilized via the voluntary carbon market are not estimated top down, as no global 
figures for private investment mobilized by the voluntary carbon market are available.  
 
From the bottom-up, CHF 40 million of investments mobilized by the private sector were reported, but 
the additionality of some of these investment flows seems questionable (see CDM additionality 
discussion above). 
 
 
2.6 Investments mobilized by Swiss public agencies (bilateral and multilateral channels) 
 
Investments are mobilized by Swiss public agencies through two channels: first, through bilateral 
climate-related development assistance and second by holding shares in multilateral development 
banks. Investments mobilized by climate-related development assistance in the years 2009-2011 are 
estimated top-down at CHF 26-339 million, which was derived by multiplying Swiss Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) commitments, marked as having climate change mitigation and/or 
adaptation as significant or principal objective (USD 50-130 million) in the years 2009-2010, with 0.4-
2.6 for the ratio of mobilized private investment to mobilizing public finance13. We are not yet able to 
estimate a reliable bottom-up number (based on the numbers of the Swiss government agencies), as 
private finance is not yet included in standard MRV systems of Swiss agencies. Also in the ODA 
impact evaluation reports (e.g. SECO, 2010), data on mobilized private investments is not included. 
Only for the SECO-financed Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets (SIFEM) we can estimate 
at least CHF 12 million of mobilized investments in low-carbon technologies14. Furthermore, we can 
estimate that the Swiss contribution to the GEF climate change focal area and LDCF/SCCF in the fast-
start period (CHF 5 million per year, see Switzerland, 2011) may have mobilized around CHF 8-14 
million of investments15 and that the 2011 SECO payments to the Scaling-Up Renewable Energy in 
Low Income Countries (SREP) fund mobilizes around CHF 8-9 million of private finance16. So we 
estimate a minimum of CHF 28-32 million of mobilized investments per year. However, this number 
excludes potential private investments in bilateral infrastructure projects and via various multi-bi 
                                                    
12 If CDM projects are additional to the “business-as-usual” scenario, so they would not have happened without CDM credit 
payments, then all private investments in CDM projects are mobilized by carbon market payments.  
13 The literature shows ratios of up to 10-15 (Stadelmann et al., 2011b) but real carbon market and public finance project-level 
data show that a realistic ratio of mobilized private finance to mobilizing finance is rather in the range of 0.4-2.6 (Stadelmann et 
al., 2012) 
14According to SIFEM’s annual report (SIFEM, 2012b), each USD of their investments was matched with USD 3.5 from other 
investors (excluding other public development finance institutions and multilateral development banks); while this number is 
2.95 for clean energy funds (personal communication with SIFEM).  We identified CHF 9 million of annual SIFEM investment in 
sustainable energy or forestry funds in the years 2008-2011, while for around  CHF 4 million per year the private co-investment 
was tracked (around CHF 12 million each year). 
15 For a sample of randomly selected 101 GEF climate change project documents  (GEF, 2011) we found that the ratio of 
investments to GEF grants is 2.9 on average. Only looking at private investments, the ratio is 1.6. We use the latter ratio as 
lower figure as it is not clear if public investments can be seen as “mobilized”. 
16 This figure was calculated multiplying the CHF 11 million payments in 2011 with 0.78, the projected ratio of private 
investment to SREP funding calculated using data from five existing investment plans (CIF, 2011) . 
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climate funds (e.g. Forest Carbon Partnership Facility), and private investments mobilized via Swiss 
climate-related ODA may, therefore, in reality be higher. 
 
Investments mobilized through shares in multilateral development banks are estimated to be USD 17-
830 million per year, which is derived by multiplying the Swiss share in multilateral development banks 
(0.8-1.7%)17 with USD 2-50 billion per year, an estimate for climate-related investments mobilized by 
multilateral development banks (Stadelmann et al., 2012).  
 
Investments mobilized by Swiss export risk insurance  
Finally, Switzerland also mobilizes financial flows through the Swiss Export Risk Insurance (SERV). 
The SERV does not insure investments of Swiss companies but it insures exports of capital goods18.  
SERV only insures exports where insurance policies are not available on the private market. 
Therefore, these exports are not likely to happen without SERV support, and “low-carbon investments 
mobilized by SERV” can be seen as equal to the delivery value of the insured exports of capital 
goods19. 
 
The top down estimate for climate-friendly investments mobilized by Swiss export risk insurance (USD 
6-33 million) is estimated by multiplying USD 700 million, the estimate of Buchner et al. (2011b) for 
green export credits in 2009 with a ratio for mobilized to mobilizing finance (0.4-2.6) and 1.9%, the 
Swiss share of OECD cash flow results of officially supported export credits from 1999-2010 (OECD, 
2012a).  
 
The bottom up estimate (CHF 50-590 million per year) is derived from an analysis of the exports with a 
new SERV insurance policy in 2009 and 2010. The low values (CHF 50-420 million) only include 
technologies for low carbon projects (railway, solar power), while the higher numbers (CHF 410-590 
million) also include exports of energy efficient (often best available) technologies to projects with high 
carbon emissions (e.g. steel plants).  
 
2.7 Total sum of private climate finance (in developing countries) mobilized by Switzerland  
 
Table 1 gives an overview of our estimates of private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland. From 
the top down, we estimate a total sum of CHF 0.5-2.7 billion of private climate finance in developing 
countries mobilized by Switzerland, while from the bottom-up (questionnaires), we estimate at least 
CHF 0.2-0.8 billion per year. These figures are, however, just a very rough estimate given that we 
were not able to obtain reliable figures for the largest flows (FDI and private finance mobilized by 
public agencies). 
 
The total of private climate finance is not the same as the sum of individual types of private climate 
finance, as some flows would be double counted: In the total figure, carbon market payments are 
excluded, as they are already covered under investments mobilized by carbon markets, and 20% of 
mobilized private finance is deducted in case of top-down figures, as it overlaps with FDI, see 
Stadelmann et al. (2011a). 
 
  
                                                    
17 The lower figure is the average Swiss share in the most important Regional Development Banks (DEZA, 2012), while the 
higher figure refers to the Swiss share in subscribed capital of the World Bank (International Development Association and 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) per June 2011 (World Bank, 2011a, 2012). 
18 In all relevant cases, insured exports were capital and not consumer goods. 
19 All of the studied exports are capital goods (e.g. solar power plant production equipment, engines, compressors, turbines) 
and not consumer goods (e.g. food, cars).   
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Table 1: Overview of private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland (rough estimates) 
 
 Top-down estimate Bottom-up estimate 
Source Global figures, country shares Questionnaires 
Unit Million CHF 
(per year) 
Share of all 
industrialized 
countries 
Million CHF 
(per year) 
Share of all 
industry. 
countries 
Year(s) 2008-2011 % 2011 % 
Carbon market payments 55-57 ~2-2.5%   
- compliance* 50 ~2.5% 46 n/a 
- voluntary 5-6 1-1.5% 9-11 n/a 
Non-return oriented finance  5-40 1-6% >16-32 n/a 
Payments for products* n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Foreign Direct Investments 150-1100 1-4% >54 n/a 
Portfolio investments n/a n/a n/a n/a 
*Investments mobilized by 450-2000    
- carbon markets (compliance) ~375-750 ~2.5% n/a n/a 
- carbon markets (voluntary) n/a n/a >40 n/a 
- bilateral develop. assistance 26-339 ~0.5-1% >28-32 n/a 
- multilateral develop, banks  17-830 1-1.5% n/a n/a 
- export insurances 6-33 2% 50-590 unknown 
Total flows,  
without double counting** ~450-2700 ~1.5-2% >230-790 n/a 
*May include public flows. Data sources and assumptions: see main text 
** For avoiding double counting, we deducted 20% of mobilized investments, which is thought to be part of FDI (the 20% is a 
conservative estimate, given that the FDI inflows to developing countries’ have only been at 13% of gross domestic capital 
formation in the years 2005-2009 (using data from World Bank, 2011b).  
  
 
3. Activities of the Swiss private sector beyond finance 
 
Apart from investing in developing countries and making charitable donations for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, Swiss companies also conduct further activities that 
lead to low-carbon investments in developing countries. Some examples are; 
-  Research & development of low-carbon and climate resilient technologies (e.g. ABB) 
-  Transfer of environmental standards from developed to developing countries by multinational 
companies  
-  Exports of clean technologies to developing countries (beyond exports promoted by the Swiss 
Export Insurance): Swiss exports are mostly expensive high tech products that enable efficient use 
of resources, such as energy or water (e.g. ABB, Stadler Rail) or the use of renewable energy (e.g 
Meyer Burger, Oerlikon Solar). One possibility to give an impression of the Swiss private sector 
contribution through clean-tech exports would be to measure the export value of low-carbon and 
climate-resilient technologies, using existing trade statistics (e.g. UN, 2011) and agreeing on a list 
of relevant technologies.  
-  Training of local staff and / or population in the use of low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies 
(e.g. ADES, Syngenta Foundation) 
-  Consulting on climate change mitigation and adaptation (e.g. Caritas, Ernst Basler & Partner, 
Infras, South Pole). 
 
Some of these activities may have a multiplicative effect, e.g. the training of staff and export of clean 
technologies may lead to further climate change mitigation beyond the primary impact of related 
technologies, via learning and diffusion.  
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Even when such activities cannot be quantified in terms of finance or reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions, it may be recommended that the Swiss government report on them as case study 
examples, in the first biennial report (January 2014)20.  
 
Apart from these non-quantifiable activities of the Swiss private sector that positively contribute to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, we may also have to mention non-
quantifiable activities that may negatively  affect climate change mitigation or adaptation, e.g. activities 
related to mines, refineries or fossil-fuel-based power plants. 
 
 
 
4. Existing and future systems for measuring, reporting and verification 
In this section, we analyze the existing procedures to measure, report and verify (MRV) the different 
types of private climate finance describe above. We also identify gaps in the data, room for 
improvement and institutions that can potentially track data in the future.  
 
While reviewing the systems, we analyze inter alia the following questions; 
-  Measurement point:  Does the system measure the sources of private finance, the outflows from 
developed countries or the inflows to developing countries (see Figure 2)? In case of “mobilized 
investments”, where is it measured? 
-  Commitments vs. disbursements/flows: does the system measure commitments for finance or 
actual disbursements/flows? 
-  Direct vs. indirect measurement: does the system directly measure the financial flows (e.g. 
carbon market payments) or does it measure different variables that serve to calculate the financial 
flows (e.g. amount of carbon credits purchased and average carbon credit price)? 
-  Verification: is the data only measured and reported or also verified? If verified, by whom? 
-  Room for improvement: what are pitfalls of the current systems? What is needed to achieve 
completeness and accuracy? 
 
 
Figure 2: Potential measurement points 
 
Country of origin                 Switzerland             Industrialized            Developing  
        Country   country 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Potential measurement points:         Origins             Outflows           Inflows 
 
4.1 MRV of carbon market payments 
 
                                                    
20 Decision 2/CP.17, Annex I, para 19: “Annex II Parties should report, to the extent possible, on private financial flows 
leveraged by bilateral climate finance towards mitigation and adaptation activities in non-Annex I Parties, and should report on 
policies and measures that promote the scaling up of private investment in mitigation and adaptation activities in developing 
country Parties” (UNFCCC, 2011b) 
Developing 
Private sector 
Swiss Entity 
Transaction costs 
Intermediary / 
Subsidiary
REDD project 
Wind turbines 
Intermediary / 
SubsidiaryIndustrial. country 
Other Swiss entity
Contribution of the private sector to Climate Change Long-Term-Finance. An assessment of private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland 
 
 
University of Zurich, on behalf of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment FOEN                                                                                           15/41
           
In the case of Switzerland, measuring the carbon market payments (compliance) is currently simple as 
one institution is sourcing more than 99% of CDM credits for the Swiss Kyoto target and this institution 
publishes an annual report with verified information on payments (Climate Cent, 2011). Furthermore, 
CERs surrendered by companies in the Swiss ETS are annually reported by the Swiss national 
emission registry (BAFU, 2012) and related payments can be estimated taken average market prices. 
The uncertainty related to market prices does not result in significant uncertainty in the overall figure, 
given the small share of credit payments (<1%) where the price is unknown. 
 
In the future, a broader system will be needed as carbon market payments for Swiss compliance may 
be conducted by different players and international agreements may ask for information verified by 
governments. A good source for this information is the Swiss national emission registry for three 
reasons. First, all CERs used for compliance in Switzerland are registered there21. Second, the 
national emission registry has to comply with UNFCCC rules that are the same for all countries with 
Kyoto targets. Therefore, international comparability is given. Third, data in the registry is externally 
verified by the UNFCCC. Given this excellent data on carbon credits used for compliance, the 
remaining MRV task for deriving carbon market payments is to measure the CER credit price, which is 
challenging as credit prices are seldom reported. One possibility to “measure” the CER credit price is 
to use market prices for already issued credits (secondary market), which are publicly available (e.g. 
PointCarbon, 2011). However, a substantial part of CDM credits are bought before issuance (primary 
market), and prices on this primary market are rarely reported22. So for an accurate estimate, the 
Swiss government would have to oblige companies using CDM credits to report the carbon credit 
price. Confidentiality concerns could be alleviated by only displaying aggregated data to the publci. 
One challenge is that most CERs are bought via international traders or brokers, so the actual amount 
of revenues accruing to developing countries may be lower than what is reported. 
 
In the voluntary market, no reliable MRV system is available. Ecoystem Marketplace (Peters-Stanley 
et al., 2011) annually reports on yearly transactions based on surveys filled out by companies but data 
is neither comprehensive nor verified. Some voluntary market players (e.g. myclimate) report verified 
data on their carbon market expenditure but data is not separated between payments to industrialized 
and developing countries. The survey result showed that voluntary carbon market payments are 
actually known to the largest Swiss companies so the governmental task would be to set up a 
(voluntary or mandatory) reporting and verification system. Special attention is needed to avoid double 
counting of carbon market payments made by Swiss companies on behalf of foreign customers and 
payments made by Swiss companies via foreign offset providers.  
 
 
4.2 MRV of non-return oriented finance (with climate benefits) 
 
Verified data on non-return oriented investments (donations) to developing countries are reported by 
major development NGOs, while the Swiss government compiles data on Swiss private donations to 
development NGOs (DEZA and SECO, 2011). However, these MRV systems do not collect data on 
the part contributing to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. The survey showed that it is, 
actually very challenging for development NGOs to measure their share of climate-related donations, 
particularly in the area of climate change adaptation. Therefore, if Switzerland considers to ask its 
private sector to report on climate related donations, it may be recommendable to provide guidance 
based on the current reporting of Rio markers on climate change adaptation and mitigation (OECD, 
2011a). Interesting data may also be compiled without further reporting obligations for Swiss NGOs by 
estimating the co-financing provided by Swiss development NGOs to Swiss ODA programmes marked 
with Rio markers23. Systems to measure independent donations or corporate initiatives of Swiss 
                                                    
21 One limitation of the registry is that the number on credits used for compliance is not known immediately after each year, as 
credits are surrendered to the UNFCCC for a multi-year period and  only three years after the end of a  crediting period (2015 in 
case of the 2008-2012 period). This is one example for the challenge of allocating funding to specific years: it can be the year of 
commitment, disbursement (Clapp et al., 2012) and in the carbon market case even the year of surrendering credits. 
22 Some estimates are available  but hardly reliable (GIZ, 2011; Linacre et al., 2011). 
23 If the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) provides ODA funding via Swiss development NGOs, these 
development NGOs are obliged to provide at least 50% co-funding. 
Contribution of the private sector to Climate Change Long-Term-Finance. An assessment of private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland 
 
 
University of Zurich, on behalf of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment FOEN                                                                                           16/41
           
companies are not known. Using annual reports may be a starting point but the climate change and 
developing country shares are rarely reported separately from other donations. 
 
 
4.3 MRV of payments for low-carbon products 
 
Systems to report payments for low-carbon products are not available at the moment. While some 
annual reports (e.g. Coop, Switzerland’s second largest retailer) include descriptions of initiatives to 
reduce the carbon footprint of purchased goods, information on revenues from these products are not 
available. Many companies measure their carbon footprint but do not specify the emissions taking 
place in developing countries. Achieving a commonly recognised definition for “low-carbon product” is 
required as starting point. However, even with a definition, the measurement will be very challenging 
given the complexity of carbon life-cycle assessment and separating out the emissions taking place in 
developing countries. Some international “consumer labels” may qualify as indicators for a low-carbon 
product in the future but at the moment, none of the labels reviewed (Forest Stewardship Council, 
labers for organic farming, Roundtable on Sustainable Palmoil and Roundtable on Responsible Soy) is 
currently a convincing indicator of a reduced carbon footprint, while the only known Swiss initiative for 
carbon labelling (Climatop) is not internationally used24. Other labels such as WindMade™ are 
currently no widely used in Switzerland. Even if decisions on labels for “climate-friendliness” were 
taken, Switzerland currently has no national data for payments for products using these labels25, so 
new MRV systems would have to be established. Moreover, the share of imports substituted by low-
carbon imports would have to be calculated, which seems a very onerous and expensive task. 
 
 
4.4 MRV of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and other investment flows  
 
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) is the official source of data regarding FDI outflows from Swiss 
companies (SNB, 2012). It provides public data on the recipient countries of Swiss FDI flows and 
distinguishes broad sectors (e.g. “electronics, energy, optical and watch making”) that do not allow for 
estimates of climate relevance. The SNB also has FDI figures per company but this data is confidential 
and can only be shared within the administration. BAFU could estimate climate-relevant FDI by coding 
companies as climate-relevant or not. However, a similar effort to estimate “green FDI” by coding 
environmental-friendly companies has been judged as very challenging by Swedish statisticians 
(OECD, 2011b), inter alia because FDI is normally only reported by larger companies (in case of 
Switzerland companies with more than CHF 10 million FDI outflows per year), whereas companies 
with environmentally friendly investments are often small. Hence, additional surveys for companies 
would be needed, thereby generating reporting burdens for them. Climate-related FDI would best be 
estimated by data per investment project but the only databases with project-level information 
(Bloomberg New Energy finance, FDI intelligence), are private (fee for data access), not externally 
verified, and likely incomplete as they are only based on publicly available data. A general challenge in 
estimating “climate change FDI”, no matter whether the analysis is done on a sectoral, company or 
project level, is the lack of an agreed definition of “climate FDI” on an international level (Buchner et 
al., 2011a; Stadelmann et al., 2011a). Reactions from Swiss companies showed that they have 
difficulties to judge whether investments are “climate-friendly” or not, so they will need detailed 
guidance (e.g. lists of investment projects that could qualify as “climate-friendly”). 
 
MRV systems do not exist for low-carbon portfolio investments. The only way to obtain this data would 
be to conduct a broad survey with companies, mainly investment banks. However, none of the 
                                                    
24 The example of Climatop also shows the challenges of labeling „low-carbon products” produced in developing countries: 
assessment costs are high and only for few product categories, low-carbon products can be clearly separated from high-carbon 
alternatives (information from a person that has assessed products on behalf of Climatop).  
25 Data is available on the market value of imported wood from developing countries and the share of certified areas in 
developing countries (BAFU, 2011). However, it is questionable if we can derive a number for payments for low-carbon forest 
products as certified products do not necessarily lead to less deforestation (expert opinion) 
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contacted banks conducting portfolio investments in developing countries through sustainable 
investment funds was able to give a reliable estimate because sustainable investment funds frequently 
change their portfolio26 and do not assess the low-carbon share in the portfolio. Furthermore, most 
portfolio investments are undertaken on a company and not project level, which raises the challenging 
task of coding companies as “climate-friendly”. The type of “low-carbon portfolio investments” that 
would be easiest to be tracked would be investments in “low-carbon funds”, where fund investors only 
buy small shares in the companies covered by the fund. However, Swiss banks currently only offer 
“low-carbon funds” with very small and frequently changing developing country shares (e.g. UBS 
Equity SICAV - Climate Change) or emerging market funds with no specific climate focus (e.g. Credit 
Suisse SICAV One Equity Global Emerging Markets). Therefore, estimating Swiss portfolio 
investments would be a very onerous task.  
 
 
4.5 MRV of investments mobilized by Switzerland 
 
In case of mobilized private investments, we do not find reliable MRV systems apart from the CDM 
(and partly the voluntary market). 
 
4.5.1 Private investments mobilized by Swiss carbon market payments 
In most cases, CDM project documents display planned investments (URC, 2012). The investment 
data is externally verified as it is relevant for assessing “additionality” of CDM projects27. The 
requirement that CDM projects are additional to the business-as-usual situation should also imply that 
the related investment is indeed mobilized by carbon market payments. As this is not always the case 
(Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2009), an international agreement may be needed on the 
percentage of investments in CDM projects that is considered to be “mobilized”. Related to the 
investment data, there are two further MRV challenges: the first is that not all planned investments 
really take place and investments are not verified ex-post. For simplicity, one may assume that all 
CDM projects with issued credits have undertaken the planned investments. The second MRV 
challenge is the attribution of mobilized investment to credits. Dividing investment by the number of 
issued credits is not feasible as the number of issued credits changes over time. Therefore, 
investment may be better attributed to credits by dividing the investment by the number of credits 
projected in the project document. 
 
In case of private investments mobilized by voluntary carbon market payments, MRV quality differs. 
Data is reliable for some voluntary carbon market standards (e.g. Gold Standard, Voluntary Carbon 
Standard, VER+) that have similar MRV systems as the CDM, publish project documents and display 
“cancelled” credits. The “cancellation” is a proof that a credit has been deleted by a specific company 
and cannot be used again. Fortunately, most voluntary credits bought by Swiss entities are externally 
verified (e.g. CDM, Gold Standard, Voluntary Carbon Standard, VER+). A challenge may be that 
voluntary carbon market documents do not always display investment figures. Furthermore, all the 
other challenges mentioned above, also apply. 
 
4.5.2 Investments mobilized by Swiss public agencies (bilateral and multilateral channels) 
In case of private investments mobilized by bilateral agencies, the relevant Swiss agencies (DEZA and 
SECO) have no established MRV procedure. Some private investments are notified in project 
documents and the SECO-sponsored Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets (SIFEM) uses 
“Mobilization of local capital and savings” as one of eight development indicator (SIFEM, 2012a), so 
for climate-relevant ODA flows through SIFEM, reliable data may be collected by SECO. Furthermore, 
                                                    
26 One of the contacted investment bank responded that portfolio investment should better be assessed for a specific reporting 
date rather than for a year. The net flow into low-carbon portfolio investment could, therefore, be assessed as the difference 
between the stock at the end of the year and the stock at the beginning of the year. 
27 Some CDM projects do not display investment data but this is getting less frequent as projects applying only a barrier 
analysis for assessment of additionality face high rejection rates. 
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SECO and BAFU invest in several “multi-bi” initiatives (bilateral funding channelled via trust funds 
managed by multilateral institutions), for which some preliminary MRV systems for private investments 
are available (see below). In all other cases, new procedures would have to be established to 
measure the mobilized investments. The most lenient way of introducing MRV of private investments 
would be to complement existing reporting documents (ex-ante project documents, monitoring and 
evaluation reports) with data on private sector co-financing. Such a figure may not only be useful for 
international reporting but also for internal evaluation of private sector involvement. One hurdle is that 
only a small part of projects is currently evaluated. An interesting opportunity is SECO’s evaluation of 
its climate change portfolio in 2014, which may include some data on private investments. Long-term, 
sustainable reporting systems would have to be integrated into existing reporting of development flows 
to the OECD. Given the ongoing burden of ODA reporting and the methodological challenges, Swiss 
development agencies are not willing to estimate mobilized investments in the absence of international 
obligations (source: interviews with representatives of Swiss development agencies). 
 
For private investments mobilized through multilateral channels, some basic MRV systems exist but 
procedures will have to be streamlined to make data comparable. The Global Environment Facility, 
through which around 10% of Swiss fast-start finance flows (period 2010-2012), requests its projects 
to report public and private co-financing, and documents are reviewed by the GEF secretariat. 
Similarly, projects of most development banks28 (Regional Development Banks and World Bank) and 
trust funds administered by development banks, usually report on public and private co-financing, but 
it is not always clear which co-financing is public or private (e.g. “borrowing countries financial 
intermediaries.”)29 Such data is also the basis for estimating “leverage ratios” (private investment to 
public funding) of development banks and agencies as recently reported (UN, 2010b, 2010c). 
Unfortunately, information is not publicly available on how the GEF or development banks estimate 
mobilized private finance and whether this data is verified. 
 
If common guidelines will be developed for both bilateral and multilateral agencies, on how to 
measure, report and verify private finance such guidelines will have to address namely the following 
issues; 
- Which investments are to be considered as “climate-friendly”?  A practical solution would be to 
count investments in projects marked with a “climate change” mitigation or adaptation Rio 
marker (climate change as principal or significant goal) as “climate-friendly”. However, the 
marking of ODA and OOF flows with Rio markers has shortcomings and may have to be 
improved (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011). 
- When are private investments to be seen as “mobilized” by multilateral and bilateral agencies? 
Some private co-finance may be business-as-usual investments that would happen without 
intervention of development agencies. While the CDM has established procedures for 
assessing “additionality” of investments, the CDM tools may be too onerous. Therefore, 
simpler decision criteria for “mobilization” may be used (e.g. timing of investment decision, 
financing the same project parts as public finance). Furthermore, more specific guidelines are 
needed for public finance tools that try to mobilize private investments at several levels, e.g. 
through public-private equity funds (Brown and Jacobs, 2011): can also indirectly mobilized 
private finance be seen as “mobilized”? 
- At which project stage are private investments to be considered? Private investments planned 
as integral part of the project, investments mobilized during the implementation period or even 
follow-up investments after the project? Using data at the project start may include planned 
but not undertaken investments, so investments mobilized during the whole project period 
may be the more accurate measure. Such investments mobilized during the project period can 
also more easily be monitored and verified with established procedures, compared to follow-
up investments after the project period. 
                                                    
28 Multilateral agencies beyond GEF and World Bank may also measure this information but public reports are not known to the 
authors. 
29 In case of the World Bank and Regional Development Banks, their loans may also be seen as (at least partially) “private 
finance”, as they are sourced on the capital market. 
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- How are investments allocated to contributor countries made through multilateral institutions? 
In the section before, we simply used the share of paid-in capital (development banks) and 
share of contribution (to trust funds, multilateral agencies) to assess the Swiss share of private 
investments. While this may a feasible solution in most cases, detailed procedures may need 
to consider the relevance of “shares subject to call” (development banks) and the difference 
between contributions through loans and grants in case of trust funds (e.g. Clean Technology 
Fund).  
 
4.5.3 Investments mobilized by Swiss export risk insurance  
The Swiss Export Risk Insurance (SERV) measures the delivery value of the insured export goods. As 
argued above, the delivery value may be considered equivalent to “mobilized investments” into Swiss 
capital goods, as the SERV only insures exports where insurance policies for such exports are not 
available on the private market. There are, however, two pitfalls with this data: first, the delivery value 
is displayed in the year of the insurance policy, but not year of export, so it cannot be guaranteed that 
all insured exports really take place. Therefore, some ex-post adjustments may be needed. Second, 
the “climate-friendliness” of export goods is not assessed by the SERV30. Our ad-hoc assessment (see 
above) may be challenged internationally. A more reasonable definition of “climate friendly” exports 
could be to only consider exported goods that receive favourable insurance or credit terms because of 
their environmental / climate change value. In this regard, Switzerland is invited to actively participate 
in the emerging OECD definition of “climate change mitigation” projects promoted by export credit 
agencies31. 
 
 
4.6 Overview of MRV systems 
 
Table 3 summarizes the best available MRV systems for private finance mobilized by Switzerland. 
Only a few flows, e.g. the majority of carbon market payments, provide a sufficient level of accuracy as 
they are both measured directly and are also verified. For all other flows, MRV systems have to be 
improved in order to receive reliable estimates. In many cases (e.g. “mobilized” private investments, 
FDI, insured exports), clear definitions of climate-friendliness are needed; using OECD guidelines on 
“climate change” markers is one possible solution, but that would require more methodological clarity 
on the markers (e.g. list of technologies or project types to be considered) as well as a process which 
allows non-OECD member countries to be involved. 
 
Table 3 also shows that requirements for improving MRV systems are high. Therefore, policy makers 
may have to consider how much financial resources are required for improvement, and whether this is 
politically acceptable; many interviewed companies responded that they would ask for compensation if 
reliable data is to be elaborated. One way to address this trade-off between reliability and data quality 
is to focus MRV on these types of private finance that are internationally accepted as part of the USD 
100 billion. Therefore, the next section will analyze the potential inclusion or exclusion of certain types 
of private finance in the USD 100 billion goal. 
 
  
                                                    
30 While climate change impacts are assessed for “projects with potential significant adverse environmental impacts” according 
to OECD environmental guidelines (OECD, 2007) this assessment does not result in projects being marked as “climate-friendly” 
or not. 
31 At the moment, only renewable energies and sustainable water projects (water purification, waste water treatment) receive 
these favorable terms (OECD, 2009), while in the future further climate change mitigation” projects (e.g. CCS, waste-to-energy 
and some energy efficiency projects are considered at the moment) may be added. 
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Table 2: Best available MRV “systems” for private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland 
 
Finance flows Data Monitoring and 
reporting 
source 
Outfl. 
Source
Mobil. 
Direct 
meas
? 
Veri-
fied
? 
Room for 
improvements  
Carbon market 
payments 
compliance 
Expenditure of 
“Climate Cent” /  
purchased CERs
Annual report / 
Swiss CO2 
registry 
S () () Credit prices 
beyond Climate 
Cent not known 
Carbon market 
payments 
voluntary 
Credit payments  Annual reports 
of some offset 
providers 
O  () () All providers, data 
on shares of 
Annex-1  
Non-return 
oriented 
finance 
(outside car-
bon market) 
Donations via 
Swiss deve-
lopment organ. 
Annual reports; 
Swiss ODA 
report 
O   Definition of 
“climate change” / 
climate part to be 
separated 
 
Donations of 
companies 
Annual reports S   
Payments for 
low-carbon 
products 
Expenditures of 
large retailers  
Annual reports  (S)   Definition of “low-
carbon”, share of 
products from de-
veloping countries 
Foreign Direct 
Investments 
(FDI) 
Swiss FDI SNB statistics O   Climate-part to be 
separated 
(company basis?) 
Investments 
mobilized by 
the carbon 
market 
Investments of 
CDM projects 
Project 
documents, 
compiled in 
URC database 
M. ()  Allocation of 
investments to 
credits? 
Investments 
mobilized by 
ODA 
Private co-
financing 
GEF project 
documents,  
few  DEZA / 
SECO docs 
M.   Common 
definition of 
“climate change” 
and “mobilization”; 
verification, 
project level data, 
Investments 
mobilized by 
multilateral 
development 
banks 
Swiss share of 
capital or 
contributions 
Websites, 
Annual Reports 
-  ? 
“Climate finance” 
of MDBs32 
UN (2010b)  M.   
Multilateral 
leverage factor  
UN (2010b)  M.   
Investments 
mobilized by 
export 
insurance 
 “Insured” 
exports 
Swiss Export 
Risk Insurance 
M.  ? Climate-
friendliness not 
assessed, only 
year of insurance 
policy known 
 
                                                    
32 As alternative to directly measuring  MDB  “climate  finance” (=climate-related development expenditure), a leverage factor for  
“climate finance”  to MDB equity could be used. This leverage factor ranges from 1.5-2 (IFC, AfDB) to 3 (IDB, ADB, IBRD), if 
equity is used for climate purposes, see UN (2010b: 7)   
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5. Overview of potential criteria for inclusion in the USD 100 billion 
 
This section provides an overview of potential criteria on which private sector contributions may be 
accounted towards the “goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the 
needs of developing countries“ (UNFCCC, 2010).” We will analyze criteria both in general and in terms 
of national delineation (“Swiss flows”).  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the types of flows that may be included or excluded from the USD 100 billion. 
This figure will serve as guideline to show the implications of different criteria. 
 
 
Figure 3: Potential flows included in the USD 100 billion 
 
 Public sector Private sector 
Industrialized 
country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing 
country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted version of figure in Whitley (2012)  
 
 
 
5.1 Criteria for flows in general 
 
The following list of criteria is mainly based on Stadelmann et al. (2011a), which is still relevant as the 
decision on long-term finance in Durban (UNFCCC, 2011a) does not introduce new wording. 
Nevertheless, we refined the analysis and included positions of some countries. 
 
5.1.1 “Mobilized [jointly] by industrialized countries”  
This is the wording found in all relevant negotiation text, the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009), 
the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010), and the Durban LCA decision (UNFCCC, 2011a). It 
certainly implies that finance, on which developing countries have no direct influence (e.g. business-
as-usual investment flows in developing countries, marked with a red arrow in Figure 3), are not part of 
the USD 100 billion. Apart from this, there is a lot of uncertainty.  
 
The single most important question is: who are the actors in “industrialized countries”? There are two 
potential sub-definitions;  
- Mobilized by public and private sector in industrialized countries: This definition includes all 
organizations, companies and governmental institutions in industrialized countries 
Legend
 
 
 
 
Transac-
tion costs 
 
 
Flow probab-
ly included in 
$100 billion 
 
 
Flow poten-
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Flow hardly  / 
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- Mobilized by governments in industrialized countries: This definition is the one proposed by 
the Dutch government, who refers to finance “mobilized through developed country public 
interventions in the form of fiscal instruments and program including fiscal measures, the 
carbon market, ODA and OOF” (Loozekoot, 2012). It also corresponds to the criteria 
“additionality – state action needed”, set up by Griesshaber (2012). The idea behind this 
definition is that only governments negotiating in UNFCCC negotiations can be hold 
responsible for their actions. In such a definition, North-South private flows on which 
industrialized governments have no influence (far right arrow in Figure 3) would not be 
counted towards the USD 100 billion goal. 
 
Another question is: How directly must the mobilized finance be related to actors in industrialized 
countries? We have three potential definitions; 
- Directly or indirectly mobilized by industrialized countries: In this version, all flows, excluding 
the red ones are included. 
- Directly mobilized by industrialized countries: Under this criterion, the finance has to be 
directly mobilized by industrialized country action. If only governments are seen as 
“mobilizing”, then finance mobilized via the industrialized countries’ private sector (arrows with 
dashed lines are not included). 
- Direct North-South flows: in this version only the arrows crossing the North-South barrier are 
counted. The idea that the USD 100 billion consists of finance crossing North-South 
boundaries is reflected in the wording “International private investment flows” used in the UN 
high-level panel on climate change financing report (2010a: 18). 
 
 
5.1.2 “Addressing the needs of developing countries” 
This is the second criterion contained in all negotiation texts (UNFCCC, 2009, 2010, 2011b) but what 
are the “needs” of developing countries? While it seems clear that the finance has somehow to be 
related to the financial needs to mitigate and adapt to climate change, two questions arise.  
 
The first question is if developing countries only need finance to cover “net” costs of adaptation and 
mitigation actions, or if they also need further investment finance to cope with imperfect capital 
markets33. The two potential definitions are; 
- All finance (=Gross flows): All finance contributing to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation: in this version, developing countries are assumed to both require cost-covering 
finance as well as investment flows to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This definition 
assumes that developing countries do not only face the challenge of covering higher costs of 
mitigation and adaptation interventions but also the challenge of imperfect capital markets (so 
lack of investment capital).  
- Finance to cover “net” or incremental costs (=Net flows34) or more specifically: finance to 
cover incremental costs of mitigation actions (and full cost of adaptation actions)35. This 
criterion is essentially the same as the “net flow” criterion, mentioned in the UN high-level 
panel on climate change financing’s report (2010a: 18)36. As financial resources provided by 
industrialized countries under the UNFCCC (1992) are not meant to cover the full costs of 
mitigation technologies (e.g. all investment costs of solar power) but only the agreed 
                                                    
33 Distinguishing the two types of flows (finance covering net costs and general investment finance) would require to assess 
how much incremental costs are covered by the finance. 
34 While we see “net flows” generally as “net benefit for recipient countries”, as suggested by the UN (2010a), “net flows” can 
also more specifically refer to FDI net inflow or net increase in liabilities (Stadelmann et al., 2011a; Grieshaber, 2012)  
35 In an earlier study (Stadelmann et al., 2011a) we have referred to this criterion as  finance “addressing barriers”, so only 
flows useful to address barriers  (e.g. costs, risks, information, policy change, access to technologies) for low-carbon and 
climate-resilient development. We have transformed it to “finance to cover incremental costs” as “imperfect capital markets” can 
also be seen as barrier, so the distinction of “finance addressing barriers” and  “gross flows” is not clear. 
36 The difference between “finance to cover incremental costs” and “net flows” is simply the perspective: the “incremental cost 
financing” looks at the needs of developing countries (covering costs of mitigation and adaptation), while net flows looks at what 
is actually flowing to developing countries if return expectations are discounted (this net flow can be used to cover costs of 
mitigation and adaptation). 
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incremental part (the difference between the business-as-usual and the low-carbon 
technology), one may argue that also in the context of the USD 100 billion, only incremental 
costs mobilized by the North are to be counted. In case of private investments, we would only 
count the “incremental” part of the investment, and only, if this incremental part is mobilized by 
industrialized countries, either through governmental incentives or lowered return expectations 
by the private sector. For most private investment flows, this incremental (or net flow) part 
would be zero.  
 
The second question related to the needs of developing countries is whether industrialized countries’ 
transaction costs for mobilizing finance (administrative costs in Northern agencies, such as 
identification and evaluation of opportunities, sourcing, transferring and monitoring financial flows, see 
yellow circles in Figure 3) are compatible with “needs of developing countries”. There are two potential 
interpretations; 
- Finance including transaction costs in industrialized countries: this interpretation assumes that 
mobilization of the USD 100 billion can only be achieved and the “needs” of developing 
countries can only be addressed if these transaction costs are covered.   
- Finance excluding transaction costs in industrialized countries: this interpretation may be 
justified when considering “Northern” transaction costs as not being part of the “needs of 
developing countries” 
 
5.1.3 Scaled-up, new and additional, predictable and adequate 
Apart from the criteria “mobilized by industrialized countries” and “addressing the needs of developing 
countries” mentioned in the same sentence as the USD 100 billion, we may also look at other wording 
in the “finance section” of UNFCCC decisions. In the sentence before the USD 100 billion (UNFCCC, 
2010), we find the wording of “scaled-up, new and additional, predictable and adequate” funding and  
“taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”. We will shortly discuss these sentences.  
 
“Scaled up”: can be interpreted as “more than the current level”, which is only a limiting criteria for 
including private finance, if total finance in 2020 is not higher than in 2009, the year when the USD 
100 billion (Copenhagen Accord) were first mentioned. Assuming this is the case, we will not further 
discuss this wording. 
 
“New and additional”: while clearly referring to fast start finance, international agreements 
(Copenhagen, Cancun) leave open if also the USD 100 billion are to be “new and additional”. The 
problem with “new and additional” is that it has never been properly defined and several potential 
definitions exist (Stadelmann et al., 2011c). In case of private finance, we have two simple 
interpretations; 
- All private finance is “new and additional”: this assessment is true if “new and additional” 
means “above current or future ODA” (see Gentry and Esty (1997)), “not counted towards 
0.7% GNI used for ODA” or “above current or projected official climate finance”. In all these 
cases, private finance is “new and additional” under the assumption that ODA or public climate 
finance is not lowered as consequence of increased private sector activity.  
- Private finance beyond the existing  level is “new and additional”: this interpretation assumes 
that additional efforts are to be taken by the private sector beyond the level of 2009 / pre 
COP15, when the USD 100 billion were pledged (Nafo, 2012), One problem with this definition 
is that the private sector may substantially increase its financing from 2009 to 2020, even 
without any international or national climate policy efforts. There, one may ask whether  “new 
and additional of private finance is better to be understood as “beyond the business-as-usal” 
level. 
 
Predictable: Predictability can be defined as low variance of flows or a variance that can be explained 
by major external parameters (e.g. growth). The level of private investment has in the past years not 
varied more than ODA on a global level (Stadelmann et al., 2011c), so as long as ODA is not excluded 
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from the USD 100 billion or is becoming more predictable, predictability cannot be seen as criterion for 
excluding private finance. 
 
Adequate: the interpretation of this criterion is unclear. We assume here that it refers to the “needs of 
developing countries”, which has been discussed above. 
 
Needs of […] countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change: This is 
not a limiting criterion if seen as overall criterion for long-term finance so some of the funds have to 
address the needs of particularly vulnerable countries. If it refers to each single flow, then it may be a 
limiting criterion as a very low share of private investment actually flows to LDCs, who can be seen as 
proxy for particularly vulnerable countries (Stadelmann et al., 2011c). 
 
 
5.1.4 No double counting with industrialized countries’ emission targets 
This criterion would mean that the USD 100 billion should not include payments for emission reduction 
credits in developing countries that enable industrialized countries to fulfil their own emission targets 
pledged in the aftermath of the Copenhagen Accord. This criterion cannot directly be found in the 
negotiation text surrounding the USD 100 billion but there are several sentences in decision texts that 
indicate the use of such a criterion.  
- First, the goal of USD 100 billion was a commitment by industrialized countries as part of a 
package including mitigation commitments by developing countries in Copenhagen: “in the 
context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation (UNFCCC, 
2009, 2010)”. Such mitigation actions by developing countries, often termed “nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) had been agreed back in Bali, under the condition 
that industrialized countries provide financial and technological support (UNFCCC, 2008). 
Therefore, one may argue that these mitigation actions are own commitments of developing 
countries and not actions that help industrialized countries to fulfil their own commitments, as 
is the case for the CDM and new market-based mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2010).  
- The second argument is that the Cancun Agreements suggest that market-based mechanisms 
are not the same as finance, they are seen as “complementing other means of support for 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties” (UNFCCC, 2010), 
while finance can be seen as “other means”.  
- Third, UNFCCC (2011) says that market-based mechanisms are to “meet standards that […] 
avoid double counting of effort.”  
One counter argument against the “double counting” criterion is that no decisions explicitly exclude 
carbon markets from the USD 100 billion (UNFCCC, 2009, 2010).  
 
Counting part of credit payments? One may argue that part of industrialized countries’ payments for 
carbon credits goes beyond the abatement costs, so seeing these payments “beyond abatement 
costs” as part of the USD 100 billion would not imply double counting. As example, the UN (2010a) 
report mentioned the possibility of calculating infra-marginal rents, the difference between market 
prices and abatement costs, and counting them as “net flows” towards the USD 100 billion. 
Stadelmann (2011a) argues that “payments above the carbon market price” could be seen as flows 
beyond carbon offset costs and, therefore, as part of the USD 100 billion. Finally, the creation of new 
market-based mechanisms (e.g. sectoral trading and crediting) may offer opportunities to consider part 
of the credit payments as finance beyond “offsetting” because new market-based mechanisms are to 
provide “a net decrease and/or avoidance of global greenhouse gas emissions” (UNFCCC 2011). “Net 
decrease of emissions” means that emissions are reduced beyond the reductions counted towards 
industrialized countries’ emission targets. Therefore, credit payments that enable the reduction beyond 
offsets would not imply double counting with targets.  
 
The calculation of the share of credit payments that enables “net decrease of emissions” would 
depend on the method to assure the “net decrease of emissions”; 
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- Discounting: If “net decrease of emissions” is to be achieved by “discounting” (Chung, 2007; 
Castro and Michaelowa, 2010), so only part of the emission reductions would count as offsets, 
then the credit payments could simply be multiplied by the share of emission reductions that 
are not counted (“discounted”) as offsets, e.g. 40%, to reach the payments enabling a “net 
decrease of emissions”, which would be part of the USD 100 billion. In fact, discounting 
already happens to a limited extent already today: 2% of all issued CDM credits are deducted 
as “share of proceeds” and the revenue of auctioning these credits is used as funding source 
of the Adaptation Fund. Therefore, these 2% share of proceeds are clearly to be seen as part 
of the USD 100 billion as they are not double-counted. 
- Ambitious baselines / crediting threshold: if “net decrease of emissions” is to be achieved by 
setting an ambitious crediting baseline / threshold, which requires developing countries to take 
on own mitigation actions before they reach the crediting threshold (Schmidt et al., 2008; 
Ward et al., 2008), then the attribution to “net decrease of emissions” is more complicated. In 
a simple case, international public finance is used to help reaching the threshold and carbon 
offset finance to finance reductions beyond the threshold; in this case only public finance is 
used to reach the “net decrease of emissions” and will be part of the USD 100 billion. In a 
more complicated case, carbon offset payments are both used to reach the crediting threshold 
and reduce emissions beyond it; in this case, a complicated assessment of the cost of 
reaching the threshold and the share of each financing source (domestic, international public 
finance, international offsets) in covering the costs would be needed to attribute a specific part 
of offset payments to the “net decrease” and, therefore, to the USD 100 billion. 
 
 
5.2 Analysis of criteria  
 
In the following, we will only analyze criteria that would restrict the types of flows to be tracked / 
accounted for: mobilized by the public sector, finance to cover incremental costs, direct North-South 
flows, exclude transaction costs in North, “new and additional” beyond 2009 level and no double 
counting. We do not analyze criteria that imply the inclusion of all types of flows (e.g. gross flows, 
mobilized by public and private sector) or that have been found to be not relevant for including or 
excluding specific types of flows (adequate, scaled-up, predictable). 
 
The criteria set out above can be analyzed with regards to their consistency with generic principles: 
Compliance with UNFCCC decisions, transparency, accountability and environmental integrity37. The 
first principle (Compliance with UNFCCC decisions) is the most relevant from a negotiation 
perspective, while two of the other principles (transparency, accountability) have been mentioned by a 
recent OECD paper on tracking private finance (Clapp et al., 2012). Finally, environmental integrity is 
a frequently used criterion under the UNFCCC, inter alia mentioned in the Marrakesh Accords 
(UNFCCC, 2001) to assure reliable accounting of emission units. The detailed principles are; 
- Compliance with UNFCCC decisions: does the criterion improve compliance with recent 
decisions under the UNFCCC (Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban)?  
- Transparency: does the criterion improve transparency of achieving the USD 100 billion 
goal? Transparency may be improved because only flows are considered for which data is 
available and comparable.  
- Accountability: does the criterion improve accountability of industrialized country 
governments? As governments are committed to the USD 100 billion, they are the only 
ones who can be held accountable for achieving this goal (“in the context of meaningful 
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation”). 
- Environmental integrity: does the criterion improve environmental integrity of the climate 
regime? “Environmental integrity” is understood here as the ability of the climate regime to 
measure efforts for achieving environmental goals with comparable units and achieve the 
set environmental goals, e.g. stabilization of the GHG concentration in the atmosphere 
                                                    
37 We did not include other principles, such as “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Capabilities” and the “Right to 
Sustainable Development” as Parties have very different understandings on how to interpret them. 
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under the UNFCCC, emission reduction goals under the Kyoto Protocol and emission 
pledges under the Cancun Agreements. 
 
In Table 3, we analyze which criteria improve or strengthen the four principles. “Compliance with 
UNFCCC decisions” is potentially strengthened by all criteria but none of the UNFCCC decision texts 
(Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban) clearly implies that one of the criteria has to be applied. 
Transparency may be improved by applying “direct North-South” flows as criterion because the 
measurement point (national boundaries) becomes evident, and flows can both be measured by 
outflows and inflows. In all other cases, we do not see improvement in transparency, actually rather a 
possible decrease because the criterion requires data that is not available (e.g. transaction costs). 
Accountability of governments is clearly improved by only including finance mobilized by governmental 
interventions, as explained and defined above. Finally, environmental integrity is strengthened by, first, 
the criterion “no double counting”, as emission reductions of supported NAMAs and acquisition of 
emission credits are not accounted for as reductions by industrialized countries, and, second, also by 
the criterion “finance to cover incremental costs”, as incremental costs is the relevant part of finance 
for achieving environmental benefits and, thus, environmental integrity is improved when only 
comparing this environmentally relevant part. While all other criteria also increase the overall amount 
of finance, and thereby, move actions closer to environmental ambition, we do not see any direct link 
to “environmental integrity” as the finance excluded by these criteria (transaction costs, funding 
mobilized by the private sector and private finance up to the 2009 level) does also contribute to 
mitigation and adaptation. Summing up, when looking at these principles, the following four criteria 
should be more thoroughly considered: Mobilization by the public sector, finance to cover incremental 
costs, direct North-South flows, no double counting. 
 
 
Table 3: Criteria for inclusion of flows in the USD 100 billion & general principles 
 
Criteria for inclusion in 
the USD 100 billion 
 
General principles 
Mobilized 
by govern-
ments 
Finance to 
cover 
increment-
tal costs 
Direct 
North-
South 
flows 
No trans-
action 
costs in 
North 
“New and 
additional” 
beyond 
2009 level 
No double 
counting 
Compliance with 
UNFCCC decisions 
() () () () () () 
Transparency        
Accountability        
Environmental integrity   ()  () () ()  
 
: clearly strengthens the principle , () may strengthen the principle 
 
 
5.3 Criteria for attributing flows to “Switzerland” 
 
Beside the question which criteria for including flows are to be chosen, further criteria are needed on 
how to attribute flows to specific industrialized countries, e.g. Switzerland. Three potential criteria for 
attributing flows (to Switzerland) would be the following;  
- Mobilized by Switzerland: All private finance mobilized by Swiss entities (either the Swiss 
government or private organizations and companies38) would be attributed to Switzerland. The 
advantages of this definition are its closeness to the wording in UNFCCC documents and the 
attribution to the country where the effort has been taken place. The disadvantage is that 
                                                    
38 Definitions of “Swiss companies” would be needed. For the interviews, we use the definition of “companies that are 
incorporated in Switzerland”, as it is technically the simplest geographic allocation criteria. An alternative definition to define 
“Swiss companies” would be “companies where the majority is owned by Swiss citizens/residents” Such a ownership-related 
definition would be closest to decision power but MRV may be complicated if companies are owned by many persons 
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“mobilized finance” is difficult to measure and double counting may occur: two “mobilizing 
countries” may claim to mobilize the same private (or public) flows39. Therefore, enough detail 
has to be provided to avoid double counting, and in case of disagreement, the owner of 
“mobilized finance” may report by which country his flows have been triggered40. 
- “Outflow” from Switzerland: this second definition would mean that all finance flowing from 
Switzerland to developing countries would be attributed to Switzerland. The advantage is that 
the measurement is straightforward but the disadvantage is that the country to which the flow 
is attributed, may not be the same as the country that has undertaken an effort (e.g. a 
headquarter may decide to invest in low-carbon technologies but the actual outflow happens 
in a country where a subsidiary is based). Furthermore, transaction costs are not covered 
under this definition. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the different attribution criteria, considering 
the same principles as above. “Mobilized by Switzerland” is in closest compliance with UNFCCC 
wording and accountability of governments, while “outflows from Switzerland” is easiest to measure, 
and therefore, assures transparency best. For overall environmental integrity of the climate regime, 
the attribution criteria should not matter. Apart from these principles, we also assessed whether the 
attribution criteria enable accounting for transaction costs, which is not the case if “outflows” is the 
criterion. Furthermore, some attribution criteria are not applicable to all types of flows, e.g. “mobilized 
investments” can only be measured with the definition “mobilized by Switzerland”. Summing up, the 
assessment clearly favours attribution according to the criterion “mobilized by Switzerland”.  
 
 
Table 4: Advantages and disadvantages of criteria for attributing flows to “Switzerland” 
 
Attribution criteria -> Finance mobilized 
by Switzerland 
Financial outflows 
from Switzerland 
Compliance with UNFCCC decisions   
Transparency  ()  
Accountability (of governments)   
Environmental integrity   ? ? 
Transaction costs are included    
Applicability to all types of flows   () 
All except mobilized 
investments 
 
  
                                                    
39 This can be shown for the case of multilateral climate finance, where GEF claims to leverage funding from implementing 
entities, while those rather see themselves as leveraging GEF funding. 
40 Our survey has shown that the owner of “mobilized finance“ might in some case even argue that his financial flows have not  
been mobilized at all. 
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6. Potential use of criteria and implications 
This section outlines the implications of using specific criteria for “private finance” on the types and the 
size of Swiss private flows that would be included in the USD 100 billion. 
  
We will assess the four criteria for private climate finance flows that came out as most relevant from 
the analysis above41;   
- Mobilized by the public sector 
- Finance that covers incremental costs  
- North-South flows  
- No double counting of emission reductions 
 
Table 5 shows which flows are included for each of these criteria.  
 
The first criterion, “mobilized by public sector”, would exclude private donations (except donations 
mobilized by governmental agencies), voluntary carbon market payments (except payments by 
governmental sources) and Foreign Direct Investment (if mobilized by governments, it is included in 
mobilized investments).  
 
If “finance has to cover incremental costs” (second criterion), we can only count carbon market 
payments, private donations and payments for products, while private investments are excluded as 
investors are assumed to expect returns at market rates and the potentially incremental part is 
covered by public agencies or the carbon market42.  
 
When using the third criterion, direct “North South flows”, we would have to deduct transaction costs  
from carbon market and voluntary payments, and only a share of mobilized investments would be 
counted as investments in developing countries will also include in-country and South-South 
investments.  
 
Finally, the criterion of “no double counting of emission reductions” excludes carbon market payments 
(both compliance and voluntary) and arguably also investments mobilized by carbon market 
payments, which can be seen as inherent part of achieving emission reductions. If all four criteria are 
used together, no private flow would be included in the USD 100 billion.  
 
Clearly, excluding all private finance flows, was not the intention of the decision in the Cancun 
Agreements, as the USD 100 billion are set to come from public and private sources. Therefore, a 
political selection of criteria will be required.  
 
 
  
                                                    
41 In all cases, we will use the criterion of “mobilized by Switzerland” to attribute funding to Switzerland as our analysis clearly 
suggests it is clearly the most favorable one. 
42 Part of private investments could be seen as “incremental”, if companies expect lower returns than market rates because 
they see a value of climate change mitigation or adaptation. One example in Switzerland is the “Alternative Bank”, which is 
lending to energy efficient housing and renewable energies at low interest rates (only in Switzerland). If such cases also exist for 
North-South investments, then the incremental part of investment could be calculated as proposed by the UN (2010a): return at 
market rates minus expected return of the investor. 
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Table 5: Implications of using 4 major criteria on the types of flows to be included in USD 100 billion 
 
Criteria for inclusion in USD 100 
billion
 
Financial Flows included 
Mobilized by 
governments 
Finance to 
cover 
incremental 
costs 
Direct North-
South flows 
No double 
counting 
Carbon market payments     
- compliance* Included Included Included*  
- voluntary (Included) Included Included*  
Donations (excl. carbon market) (Included) Included Included* Included 
Payments for products*  Included Included* Included 
Foreign Direct Investments   Included* Included 
Investments mobilized by     
- carbon markets (compliance) Included  (Included) (Included) 
- carbon markets (voluntary)   (Included) (Included) 
- bilateral agencies Included  (Included) Included 
- multilateral institutions Included  (Included) Included 
- export insurances Included   Included 
 
Included = Included in the USD 100 billion, when applying the criterion in this row 
Included* = Included flows but transaction costs in the North are excluded 
(Included) = Part of the flows is included 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows the impact of the total number of private finance that Switzerland can claim to mobilize 
if some of the criteria are used. We will use the top-down estimates for Foreign Direct Investments, 
investments mobilized by compliance carbon markets and multilateral institutions here, as a reliable 
bottom-up estimate has not been possible for these flows. For all other flows, we use the bottom 
numbers. The total figure of private finance mobilized by Switzerland drops from CHF 0.5-2.7 billion 
(all funding flows) to around CHF 0.3-2.3 billion if either “mobilized by the private sector” or “no double 
counting” is used as criterion. It even goes down to CHF 0.2-1.2 billion if “direct North-South flows” are 
used as  criterion, and to less than CHF 0.1 billion if finance has to cover incremental costs. As 
explained above, the number drops to virtually zero if all criterion (or even just “mobilized by the public 
sector”, “incremental costs” and “no double counting” together) are used. 
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Table 6: Implications of using 4 major criteria on the amount of Swiss funding (in CHF million)  
 
Criteria for inclusion in $ 100 
billion
 
Financial Flows 
Mobilized 
by  
govern-
ments 
Finance to 
cover inc-
remental 
costs 
Direct 
North-
South 
flows 
No double 
counting 
Criteria for 
Attribution to 
Switzerland 
Carbon market payments     Mobilized  
- compliance* 46 46 37-41* 1** 
+ Costs above 
market price) 
Mobilized 
- voluntary <1 9-11 7-10* 9-11 Mobilized 
Donations (excl. carbon market) 0*** >16-32 13-29* >16-32 Mobilized  
Payments for products*  n/a n/a n/a Mobilized  
Foreign Direct Investments   150-1100 150-1100 Outflows 
Investments mobilized by     Mobilized  
- carbon markets (compliance) ~375-750  (Part of 
FDI) 
 Mobilized  
- carbon markets (voluntary) <4  (Part of 
FDI) 
>40 Mobilized  
- bilateral agencies >28-32  (Part of 
FDI) 
>28-32 Mobilized  
- multilateral institutions 17-830  (Part of 
FDI) 
17-830 Mobilized  
- export insurances 50-590   50-590 Mobilized  
Total Swiss private funding 
using this criterion  
500-2200 <100 200-1200 300-2300  
All figures are based on bottom-up estimates, except for FDI and investments mobilized by carbon market and multilateral 
institutions, where top-down estimates were used. 
* We assumed that 10-20% of these payments do not flow North-South; this number is based on the roughly 10% of bilateral 
flows used for administration and other in-donor activities as share of bilateral assistance  (OECD, 2012b) and the 10-20% 
overhead costs claimed by carbon offset and development organizations (Caritas, 2012; myclimate, 2012) . 
** 2% share of proceeds not seen as “double counted” 
*** DEZA requires that for receiving grants from DEZA NGOs have to provide at least as much co-finance. We assumed here 
that this co-finance consists of business-as-usual flows, so they are not triggered by DEZA. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This study explored private finance (mobilized by Switzerland) in the context of the goal of 
industrialized countries to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from public and private 
sources, to address the needs of developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change. 
The study had a particular focus on Switzerland as one of the industrialized countries that contributes 
to the mobilization of private finance. We estimated the current private climate finance flows mobilized 
by Switzerland, identified existing systems for measuring, reporting and verifying these flows, 
analyzed criteria to include or exclude some of the flows from counting as part of the USD 100 billion 
figure. Finally, we explored the implications of different criteria on the amount of Swiss private flows 
that can be accounted for as part of the USD 100 billion commitment.  
 
In a first step, this study tried to estimate private finance mobilized by Switzerland that contributes to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. From global figures we derive that 
all private flows mobilized by Switzerland (public and private sector) together may amount to roughly 
CHF 0.5-2.7 billion per year. Based on 35 questionnaires and Swiss documents, we estimate at least 
0.2-0.8 billion Swiss’ mobilized private finance in 2011. However, substantial flows are missing in the 
latter figure, as part of foreign direct investments and investments mobilized by carbon markets and 
multilateral institutions are not included. Both figures are only first approximations, as they are either 
derived from global estimates or from national and firm-level data that is mostly non-verified. 
Unfortunately, accurate data on the largest flows (climate-related FDI outflows from Switzerland and 
private finance mobilized by public climate finance) is not available, so only a broad range of the 
potential size of flows could be estimated. A further challenge is that “climate finance” itself has never 
been defined on a global level, so we had to use ad-hoc assumptions on which financial flows 
contribute to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. The estimation of financial flows has also 
shown that some activities of Swiss companies with benefits for developing countries are difficult to 
value (e.g. research & development, export of climate-friendly technologies, consulting, education and 
awareness raising), and, therefore, the private sector finance part in the biennial update report may 
also include some qualitative information on these activities. 
 
In a second step, existing systems for measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) private finance were 
analyzed. Only for two flows well-established MRV systems exist: for compliance carbon market 
payments (nowadays focused on one actor) and investments mobilized by carbon market payments 
(contained in verified project documents). However, carbon market payments may become more 
difficult to measure if more market players will buy compliance credits for the Swiss emission target. 
Building up reliable MRV systems for other flows may be burdensome, particularly for private sector 
companies. Therefore, it may be useful to wait for international decisions on which private flows are to 
be considered before building up costly MRV systems. Another strategy is to explore – nationally or 
internationally – whether politically acceptable (but not perfect) data quality can be achieved with 
some minimal efforts, in order to reduce transaction costs.  Such a low-cost MRV strategy may be 
applied to the case of private finance mobilized by Swiss bilateral agencies, as such finance is to be 
reported in the biennial report in January 2014. For better understanding the Swiss private sector 
flows, an analysis of FDI by Swiss companies as well as a workshop with industry experts may be 
useful. 
 
In a third step, potential criteria for including or excluding different types of flows from the USD 100 
billion were discussed. Studying the negotiation documents, we derived several potential criteria, such 
as mobilized by governments, only including finance covering incremental costs, excluding transaction 
costs in the North, “new and additional”, no double counting with other emission reduction claims, and 
only accounting direct North-South flows. Assuming that the principles of transparency, accountability, 
environmental integrity and the compliance with international agreements should be strengthened, we 
conclude that there are good arguments to consider at least the criteria of “mobilized by governments”, 
“finance covering incremental costs”, “no double counting with other emission reductions”, and “direct 
North-South flows”. 
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As last step, we looked at the implications of choosing one or several of these criteria on the amount 
of private finance mobilized by Switzerland. Only including finance mobilized by the Swiss government 
would reduce the number to approximately CHF 0.6-1.7 billion, mainly because FDI not mobilized by 
the Swiss government is excluded. If only finance covering incremental costs is counted, then the 
number drops to less than CHF 0.1 billion as only carbon market payments and voluntary donations 
are included. Direct North-South flows leads to a figure of approximately CHF 0.2-1.2 billion, while “no 
double counting” implies exclusion of carbon market payments and related investment flows, so the 
remaining flow is approximately CHF 0.3-2.1 billion per year. Using all criteria together means that 
hardly any flows are to be included, except potentially carbon market payments above the market 
price, private donations mobilized by public agencies and carbon market payments not used for 
compliance but mobilized by the Swiss government. 
 
What are potential further steps related to the issue of MRV and accounting of climate private finance? 
1) Clarifying the Swiss (proposal for a) definition of “climate-friendly private finance”: this 
document has set out potential private finance flows that can be seen as “mobilized by 
Switzerland”. It has also analyzed criteria to decide which flows are included or not. However, 
this document does not result in a definition, as this is inherently a political decision – both at 
the international level (negotiations, see below) and the national level (position in the 
negotiations, interim definition as long as no international agreement is available).  
2) Agreeing on international definitions for “private climate finance”: Swiss private climate finance 
data will only become meaningful if it receives international recognition. Therefore, an 
international agreement on the definition of “private climate finance” (or “private finance to be 
seen as part of the USD 100 billion”) is needed. This definition will have to address two 
questions: which flows are part of “private finance” and which of the selected flows are to be 
seen as “climate-friendly” (addressing the climate change mitigation and adaptation needs of 
developing countries). The second definitional question (“climate-friendly”) applies to public 
sector flows as well, and may be based on the OECD definition of the Rio marker. Given the 
experience of Swiss development agencies (SECO and DEZA) with the current Rio marker, it 
may be desirable to have not only a generic definition of “climate change mitigation and 
adaptation” as is currently the case for OECD Rio markers but to agree on a list of eligible 
technologies/project types. Different fora could be envisaged to start technical discussions on 
the topic: inter alia informal group of interested countries, SBSTA or the Standing Committee. 
3) Improving data availability and quality: the analysis has shown that data availability and quality 
for almost any type of flow has to be improved in order to provide reliable figures. As the 
setting-up of MRV systems may imply substantial costs for companies and public agencies, it 
is recommendable to only set up such MRV systems (even for a preliminary test period) once 
there will be greater clarity at international level about which flows to include in the 2020 
finance target. In the intermediate, Switzerland may focus on the flows that are to be included 
in the 2014 biennial report: private finance mobilized by governmental agencies. For private 
finance mobilized via multilateral finance, Switzerland may initiate or support international 
discussions, including experts from interested governments, relevant international 
organizations, NGOs and the private sector, to find internationally acceptable ways of 
measuring private finance mobilized by multilateral and bilateral agencies.  
 
Finally, MRV is just one of two key questions in relation to private finance as part of long-term climate 
finance. The second, and for the climate regime the most important question is how to mobilize private 
finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The questionnaires 
revealed that not only finance and incentives in the North but even more policy incentives as well as 
economic and legal stability in the South would help to increase private finance addressing climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in the South. In this regard, policy makers will have to analyze and 
strengthen not only international climate policy but also, or even more, enabling environments in 
developing countries, particularly the adoption of climate policies at the national level. 
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9.  Annex 
 
9.1 Questionnaire sent to private companies and organizations (English version) 
 
 
Questionnaire “Private finance for climate change protection in developing/emerging countries”, 2011 
 
 
Name of company / organisation        
Contact person Name:       
 Tel       
 
Instructions 
-  Please consider all your financial means that contribute to greenhouse gas (emission) reductions (e.g. 
renewable energy, reducing deforestation, CO2 capture and storage) and / or adaptation to climate change 
(e.g. improved weather data, insurances, coastal protection, improved water and food security) in developing 
and emerging countries. 
 -  Please use a wide definition of finance / financial means. Climate-friendly finance can contribute to the 
following measures contributing to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation 
- Technology-related measures and investments (e.g. production and installation of solar plants)  
- Research and Development of technologies used in developing countries 
- Education and formation in developing/emerging countries 
- Planning and consulting   
- Purchase of climate-friendly products 
-  Financial means are also climate-friendly if they are not invested primarily because of climate change but if 
they are nevertheless contributing to greenhouse gas (emission) reductions and / or adaptation to climate 
change 
-  In case of uncertainty you find the most important terms in the annex. 
 
 
1) How much finance did you spend for climate protection in developing/emerging countries in the year 
2011? 
 
Type of private finance Estimated amount  
 Equity (gross/net)  ca       CHF Million 
 Loans (gross/net) ca       CHF Million 
 Finance w/o return expectations ca       CHF Million 
 Payments for carbon credits  ca        CHF Million 
 Payments for other products ca       CHF Million 
 Other finance        ca       CHF Million 
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2) Did you channel part of the financial means via another organization or company in industrialized 
countries? 
 
 Yes   No  
If yes, which share was channeled via a Swiss company / organization?   ca       %  
If yes, which share was channeled via a company / org, in another industrialized country? ca.      % 
 
 
3) Do all your financial means originate from the Swiss private sector (private donors, investors, carbon 
credit buyers in Switzerland)?  
 
 Yes   No 
If no, which share does originate from the Swiss government?  ca      %  
If no, which share does originate from other governments?  ca      %  
If no, which share does originate from the private sector abroad?  ca      % 
 
 
4) Did your financial means leverage further climate-friendly investments (outside your organization or 
company)? 
 
 Yes   No  
If yes, how much climate-friendly investments were leveraged?       CHF Million 
 
 
5) Which share of the financial means did contribute to greenhouse gas (emission) reductions and 
adaptation to climate change? 
 
ca       % for greenhouse gas (emission) reductions    ca      % for adaptation    ca      % for both 
 
 
6) Were part of the financial means triggered by the Swiss government (e.g. via subsidies, export 
promotion, emission trading, obligations, incentives)? 
 
 Yes   No  
If yes, which share was triggered by the Swiss government: ca.      % 
 
7) Is it possible to improve the data quality of the mentioned financial means to the level “reliable” (max. 
+/-10% uncertainty)? 
 
Quality already  
given  
Yes, it is possible Possible, if 
compensation 
Not possible 
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8) In which areas did you primarily use your financial means? 
 
Sector 
  Power plants 
  Buildings / households 
  Industry 
  Agriculture 
  Forestry 
  Waste  
  Transport 
        
Technology/ Area 
  Renewable Energies 
  Energy efficiency 
  Afforestation / REDD 
  Recycling 
  Waste water treatment 
  Information technology 
        
        
Type of intervention 
   Hardware production (e.g. engines) 
   Hardware installation (e.g. solar power) 
   Consulting 
   Planning 
   Education / formation 
   Insurances 
   Research & Development 
         
Details:         
 
 
9) Do you plan to upscale your financial means with climate benefits in developing countries in the 
next few years? 
  
 Yes        No, same means      No, lower means  
 
 
10) In which cases would you increase your financial means? 
 
                Influence very small       small    medium    strong     very str.  
 
More donations / contracts        
Governmental support in industrialized countries       
Economic growth in industrialized countries       
Export risk guarantees in industrialized countries       
Higher carbon price (emission trading)        
Governmental support in developing countries       
Improved rule of law in developing countries       
Political stability in developing countries       
Economic growth in developing countries       
Other:             
 
 
 
11) Would you be ready, in relation to these financial means (mobilization / measurement), … 
 
… to have a thorough conversation?   Yes   No  
… to participate in a half-day workshop    Yes   No  
 
 
 
Contribution of the private sector to Climate Change Long-Term-Finance. An assessment of private climate finance mobilized by Switzerland 
 
 
University of Zurich, on behalf of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment FOEN                                                                                           39/41
           
12) Do you have any further comments or suggestions (e.g. data quality, problems when estimating 
these flows, differences to other years, unclear definitions, other contributions to climate change)? 
 
      
      
 
Thanks a lot for filling and returning this form to; 
 
martin.stadelmann@pw.uzh.ch 
or 
Universität Zürich, Institut für Politikwissenschaft 
z. H. Martin Stadelmann  
Affolternstrasse 56 
CH-8050 Zürich 
 
 
 
Appendix: definitions of the most important terms 
 
Industrialized countries OECD countries without Chile, Israel, Mexico, South Korea. 
Developing / emerging countries Non-European countries not belonging to the OECD + Chile, Israel, 
Mexico, South Korea.  
Equity Equity finance (incl. mezzanine financing) that contributes to climate 
protection in developing/emerging countries, e.g. new companies, buying 
shares of existing companies. Also investments in Research & 
Development if the products are to be used in developing countries (only 
count part of R&D investment if the products are only partly used in 
developing   countries). If possible display both the gross and the net (new 
equity – disinvestments) value. 
Loans Loan finance contributing to climate protection in developing/emerging 
countries. If possible display both the gross and the net (new loans – 
repayments) value. 
Finance w/o return expectations Financial means of companies, foundations and associations with no or 
lower return expectations. Payments for carbon credits are not included 
here. 
Payments for carbon credits Payments for carbon credits, either on a voluntary basis or because of 
obligations towards the government  
Payments for other products  Payments for products that cause less greenhouse gas emissions during 
their production and transportation compared to similar products (e.g. 
renewable electricity) 
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9.1 Questionnaire sent to Swiss governmental agencies (German version) 
  
 
„Fragebogen zu privaten Finanzmitteln 2011 für den Klimaschutz in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern“ 
 
Name der öffentlichen Stelle        
Ansprechspartner,  Name:       
 Email:       
 Tel:       
 
Definitionen 
 
climate-relevant Projekte mit Rio-Marker 1 (climate change as  "significant objective")  
climate-specific Projekte mit Rio-Marker 2 (climate change as  "principal objective") 
Entwicklungs- & Schwellenländer  Alle ODA-eligible countries (siehe 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/48858205.pdf) + Israel & Südkorea  
Investitionen (brutto/netto) Kapitalanlagen, die zum Klimaschutz in Entwicklungs- und 
Schwellenländern beitragen, z.B. Gründung neuer Firmen, Aufstockung des 
Aktienkapitals oder  Beteiligung an Firmen (auch via Kauf von öffentlich 
gehandelten Aktien). Wenn möglich ist neben dem Brutto- auch der 
Nettobetrag (Investitionen - De-Investitionen) anzugeben 
Bilaterale EZA Bilaterale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit,  
Multilaterale EZA Multilaterale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, inkl. Multi-Bi (Gelder über Trust 
Funds bei multilateralen Organisationen / Banken). 
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1) Welche Geldmittel haben Sie im Jahre 2011 für klimafreundliche Massnahmen in Entwicklungs- und 
Schwellenländer aufgewendet? 
 
Typ an Finanzmitteln Mio. CHF  für 
mitigation 
 
1 USD =0.94 
CHF 
 
Mio. CHF  für 
adaptation 
 
1 USD =0.94 CHF 
 
   Datenqualität  
SCH=Schätzung  
INT = Intern, aber verlässlich  
VER = Extern verifiziert 
Bilaterale EZA „climate-relevant“              SCH   INT    VER 
Bilaterale EZA „climate-specific“              SCH   INT    VER 
Multilaterale EZA „climate-relev.“              SCH   INT    VER 
Multilaterale EZA „climate-spec.“              SCH   INT    VER 
 
 
2) Welcher Anteil der aufgeführten Finanzmittel wurden via eine andere Schweizer Firma oder 
Organisation in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer eingesetzt? 
 
Typ an Finanzmitteln  % via Schweizer 
Firma/NGO 
Datenqualität  
Bilaterale EZA „climate-relevant“        %  SCH   INT    VER 
Bilaterale EZA „climate-specific“        %  SCH   INT    VER 
   
 
 
3) Welche privaten Investitionen / Kredite wurden durch diese Finanzmittel ausgelöst? 
 
Typ an Finanzmitteln Ausgelöste 
Investitionen 
Datenqualität  
Investitionen / Kredite ausgelöst durch…   
Bilaterale EZA „climate-relevant“        Mio. CHF  SCH   INT    VER 
Bilaterale EZA „climate-specific“        Mio. CHF  SCH   INT    VER 
 
 
4) Wie gross schätzen Sie den Aufwand, die Datenqualität auf die Stufe „verlässlich“ (max. +/-10% 
Unsicherheit)  zu verbessern? 
 
 Qualität  schon 
gegeben 
Intern    
möglich 
Möglich, wenn 
entschädigt 
Nicht möglich 
 
 
Private Investitionen, ausgelöst 
durch bilaterale  EZA 
 
  
 
   
 
      
    
 
 
Danke vielmals für das Ausfüllen und Retournieren bis 15. April an: martin.stadelmann@pw.uzh.ch 
 
 
